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II.—THE LINE OF ADVANCE IN PHILOSOPHY. 
By HENRY STURT. 
I T will seem unusual and perhaps even presumptuous to 
attempt to indicate the line along which philosophy is to 
develop in the immediate future. In the past thinkers have 
made advances without any clear notion whither they were 
going; and it has been left for historians to point out the 
logical connection of one stage with another. But I do not 
see why philosophy in this more self-conscious age should not 
advance self-consciously—why it should not choose a definite 
line and try to get further by it. I t is rather characteristic 
of contemporary thinking to make such a deliberate choice, 
well aware that the standpoint chosen is neither all-compre-
hensive or final. The old philosophers were haunted by the 
phantom of finality; each great system-maker dreamed that 
his system was the term in which the human mind would 
at last find rest. We have flung away finality. We confess, 
indeed desire, that our synthesis, into which we put our best 
just now, may have its chief use in leading on to the ampler 
syntheses of the future. 
The line of advance which I should like philosophy to take, 
and which I believe it actually will take, consists primarily in 
recognising more fully than hitherto the importance of striving 
in human experience. If this be so, the philosophy of the 
future will be a form of Voluntarism, but it will differ not 
inconsiderably from the forms of the past. The striving I have 
in view is not the impersonal cosmic striving of Schopenhauer 
and his followers, but the personal striving which is known to 
us by introspection and by common observation of the people 
around us. So far from being a blind irrational force, it has the 
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consciousness which belongs to human purpose, and it grows in 
rationality as our purposes grow clearer. And on another 
side the line of thought I advocate differs from a subjectivist 
voluntarism like that of Fichte in its view of the objective 
world. I t accepts the scientific position that we live in a 
world of forces which act upon us, some of which we strive to 
direct to the furtherance of our own purposes. 
The establishment of a philosophy of striving would amount 
to a revolution of English thought, because the philosophy still 
dominant among us is based on principles which ignore the 
kinetic and dynamic element in nature and man. The tendency 
still exists to speak of nature as though it were statical in 
essence, however mutable it might appear. In early thought 
such a tendency can be easily explained. Science is based 
on the discovery of uniformities in the flux of phenomena; 
and this predisposed the early thinkers to concentrate atten-
tion upon the uniformities, to emphasise them as the true 
realities, and to speak slightingly of the mutable concrete 
facts as unreal. No less statical in reality, though in appear-
ance recognising movement, is the dominant conception of the 
human spirit. We have, it is true, got rid of the wax-tablet 
theory which left man no function in forming his own thoughts. 
But are the current principles any real improvement ? Professor 
Bosanquet's favourite phrase, the self-determination of thought, 
seems to countenance the Hegelian doctrine of category spinning 
itself out from category by an inherent necessity or immanent 
dialectic. Mr. Bradley's doctrine of the self-realisation of ideas 
seems to make the mind a mere playground for alien creatures, 
called ideas, to disport themselves in. Is it possible to ignore 
more completely the most important features of man, of his 
environment, and of the relation between them ? 
When we once have grasped the principle, so indispensable 
for science, that there are permanent, or at least persistent, 
uniformities in material nature, there is no need to shrink 
from recognising that, in its concrete presentation, it consists 
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of things constantly in motion and charged with force. Natural 
forces are constantly impinging on us: they destroy us if we do 
not react against them, and they are capable of being diverted 
to serve our ends. And the self, on the other hand, is not 
an impressionable wax-tablet or an empty playground or a 
chain of categories. I t is a creative force, different in kind 
from material forces, yet capable of interacting with them: 
and it develops not merely logically but practically (if such an 
antithesis is possible) by conative interaction with the material 
environment and with other selves. This characteristic of 
striving never entirely ceases in each man's life, so long 
as he is fully himself: and every important concept, every 
important function of his nature, is penetrated by it through 
and through. 
It is in developing the significance of striving over the 
whole field of thought that the advance I anticipate will be 
accomplished. To enunciate a wide-reaching general principle 
is easy enough; the great achievement is its application in 
detail. If Voluntarism were applied in detail it would change 
everything that the dominant school of thought now takes for 
granted. The effect of such a change would be, as I believe, 
to bring philosophy much nearer to reality, and to dispel that 
unfortunate air of paradox which has clung to philosophy for 
ages, but of which few understand the secret. 
It may clear up still further the import of this form of 
voluntarism if I mention what I regard as its philosophic 
antecedents. The first is Idealism, as that term has been 
understood in Oxford for the last 40 years or so. Fluctuating 
as its meaning is, I think that this term means to most of us 
who use it nothing more dogmatically definite than that the 
world is to be interpreted by spirit rather than by matter. I 
do not use it to imply any " cheap and easy" reduction of 
matter to spirit; but I do imply that, if we are to have a 
monism, it must be spiritual, not materialistic like Haeckel's. 
Taking this view, I would be understood to concur with the 
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main points of T. H. Green's defensive argument against the 
naturalism of his day, by which he shows that the higher 
human activities in knowledge and morality exhibit a principle 
incapable of being resolved into what, in his language, is 
" merely natural." I may remark in passing that the import-
ance of Green's work in this direction lay, not so much in 
providing a set demonstration of a spiritual world-view, as 
in dissipating the prejudice in favour of materialism which is 
inevitable in an age preoccupied with material science. Such 
a prejudice is always strong in men whose habit of thinking 
in material categories has not been corrected by philosophic 
training; but it tends to disappear when men have been 
trained to introspection and have come to see that material 
categories are inadequate to mind. 
The other antecedent to which I would attach myself is 
the scientific doctrine of Development, with its biological 
formulae of adaptation to environment, struggle for existence 
and survival of the fittest. The naturalists have taught us 
that the forms of life are not persistent, but mutable like 
all other mundane things; and that their mutability, though 
partly due to the external pressure and selection of nature, is 
due also to the striving of living things to maintain and extend 
their life. From biology the doctrine of Development has been 
extended into anthropology; and the extension is justifiable, 
since far-sighted purpose and the higher activities generally do 
not count for much in the sum total of savage life. But the 
doctrine of Development may be applied to the most spiritual 
elements of our life, provided always we remember that we are 
on a plane above biology, and that the striving which is the 
mainspring of the development is here far-sighted and pur-
poseful. 
To those who hold firmly both to Idealism and scientific 
Development, a form of Voluntarism is certainly the best 
solution of obvious difficulties. The late Professor Eitchie's 
attempt to exhibit Hegel as the " truth " of Darwin only shows 
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more plainly the impossibility of reconciling the non-dynamic, 
self-contained thought-development of Dialectic with the 
dynamic interaction of self and the world postulated hy 
Science. If we take modern science seriously we must either 
hold that the self is the product of its selfless environment, 
or we must hold that the self makes its own characteristic 
contribution to the sum of experience. The first alternative 
is forbidden by Idealism, and if we accept the second we have 
implicitly accepted Voluntarism. The self must be regarded 
as a force able to play its own part in striving with the world; 
and, as it grows, its striving must exhibit more and more the 
characteristic qualities of its own nature; in other words, it 
must grow increasingly self-conscious and purposeful. 
In philosophy, as in cookery, the proof of the pudding is in 
the eating; or, to return from culinary metaphor to military, 
the justification of a line of advance is the conquest which 
results from it. Now, in a short anticipatory paper like the 
present, conquest is not to be thought of; and my argument 
must therefore lack its proper proof. Nevertheless, enough 
work has been done recently to give an indication, however 
scanty, of the direction that a philosophy of striving will take. 
In metaphysics I can instance the work done by Mr. Canning 
Schiller in his essay " Axioms as Postulates," and in certain of 
the essays in his Humanism. When Mr. Schiller says, " The 
world, as it now appears, was not a ready-made datum; it is 
the fruit of a long evolution, of a strenuous struggle . . . . it is 
a construction which has been gradually achieved" {Personal 
Idealism, p. 54), he is, I believe, enunciating a principle which 
is true and fundamental; though opinions may differ as to the 
way that principle is to be carried out in detail. In logic I may 
refer to my own essay, " The Logic of Pragmatism " (in the 
third volume of these Proceedings, N.S.), where I have 
attempted to show by examination of our chief logical functions 
and concepts " that the logician must take due account of the 
active side of life if he would interpret knowledge aright." In 
c 






34 HENRY STURT. 
ethics, so far nothing of the kind has been done; and therefore 
I may be pardoned if I try to indicate, so far as can be done in 
a few sentences, the general direction which a voluntarist theory 
of conduct would take. In the first place it would recognise 
the connection, for which evolutional moralists have contended, 
between morality and biological survival. Good morality has 
been valuable in the struggle against nature, and still more so 
for purposes of social co-operation. Were it otherwise it is 
hard to see how morality, as we know it, could ever have 
developed at all, or how it could maintain itself even now. 
But important as this is, it is hardly of the essence of the 
matter; for this is biological striving, not moral. It would 
be for the voluntarist moral philosopher to show that striving 
enters into the very essence of morality; that moral senti-
ments are kept alive only so far as they are brought into 
effective operation; that ideals are made by the person who 
has them, that they represent his working principles of conduct 
and change with his spiritual growth or decay; that maxims, 
customs and institutions bear a similar relation to the moral 
consciousness of society; that the end itself, the richer and 
better experience which morality affords, is an active energetic 
experience, not a quiescent blessedness ; and that, in sum, the 
best moral life is not an affair of passive obedience, but is as 
much an individual creation as good poetry. 
The hostile influences that oppose voluntarism may be 
termed comprehensively the Passive Fallacy; by which I mean 
the tendency to ignore the kinetic and dynamic aspect of the 
world and of man. To trace the rise and development of the 
Passive Fallacy would need a separate dissertation, but one 
may say shortly that it has been fostered by everything which 
has separated the life of study from the life of action. Normally, 
study and action are mutually indispensable, and the normal 
case of study is the attention we give to an object in preparation 
for operating on it. In primitive society we can hardly imagine 
study divorced from action; but with the rise of education and 
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an educating class a noticeable separation takes place. The 
Passive Fallacy might, indeed, be described as a disease of 
education. To enumerate fully all the causes of this disease 
would take too long, but among them may be mentioned the 
tendency of educators, in checking the natural precipitancy of 
the young, to forget that, though action should be made to 
wait on study, it is really the end of study; the mere pro-
fessional prejudice of educators which makes them forget the 
subordinateness of their own speciality; the tendency of 
educational methods to grow obsolete, and therefore useless for 
practice; the difficulty of ill-educated laymen in checking 
educators and making them keep their tenching abreast of 
current utility; the preference of educators for obscure, difficult 
and uselessly recondite subjects as an easy mode of impressing 
pupils ; the over-praise of docility in pupils due to the inability 
of educators to realise that their views can be superseded; 
the desire of educators to found schools of thought, due to the 
same tendency which makes religious thinkers desire to found 
churches; the minute specialisation of educators; their pre-
occupation with technique; their exaggerated estimate of the 
historical or " record " side of knowledge (as opposed to inven-
tiveness and originality), because it is more tangibly estimated; 
the liking of pupils for the same, because it is more quickly 
rewarded; the reaction of educators against the philistinism of 
the world of action, more particularly its commercial side. All 
these causes, more especially the last half-dozen, are intensified 
by the concentration of education in academic societies; but 
we can trace their operation even from the days of Plato, and 
they finally result in a most unfortunate tendency to regard 
the life of study or contemplation as quite distinct from and 
superior to the life of action. 
We find the influence of the Passive Fallacy in certain 
wide-reaching principles which admit or encourage an anti-
dynamic interpretation of the world. Of these the most 
notable is Intellectualism, which, beginning with a general 
c 2 
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emphasis on the thought-element of our nature, to the neglect 
of the rest, culminates in Panlogism, or the reduction of every 
side of our nature to some form of thought. Hardly less 
famous, and certainly more conspicuous just at the present 
moment, is Absolutism, which denies that the world can change 
because it is divine and perfect, and merges human individuality 
and activity in the One-and-All, thus degrading all motion and 
activity to an unreal appearance of an essentially passive 
Absolute. A third principle of the same tendency is Sub-
jectivism, culminating in Solipsism. It is true that some 
subjectivist or solipsistic thinkers, like Fichte, have emphasised 
strongly the active side of experience, but it is certain that 
they occupy an inconsistent position. For without indepen-
dently real objects on which to direct our activity we must beat 
the void without effect; and, moreover, all the stimulus which 
comes from interaction with the environmont—indispensable 
to activity as we know it—is lacking. In Hegel all three 
principles are combined; it is, in fact, to Hegelian influence 
that the Passive Fallacy mainly owes its predominance 
among ns. 
In the present position of thought and of social conditions 
in general there is much to favour the recognition of the 
Philosophy of Striving. If it be true, as I have tried to prove, 
that it requires the combination of idealism with the scientific 
doctrine of Development, we could not have had it till those 
streams of thought were ready for fusion. In the days when 
Green's influence was predominant at Oxford they flowed like 
rivers that join but will not intermingle. Those who began 
philosophy in the eighties will remember how, in passing from, 
say, the Data of Ethics to the Prolegomena to Ethics, they 
seemed to pass into another world, and how impossible it was 
to bring into one focus treatises which professed to deal with 
the same material. The idealists had no knowledge of or 
sympathy with science; and the scientific men had no philo-
sophical training. And years had to elapse before the 
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deficiencies on both sides could be made good. Probably this 
would have been effected much earlier but for the rising 
influence of Hegelianism, which for a time carried men's minds 
off in quite another direction. 
And apart from the philosophic position there is in the 
general social condition of the time much to encourage the line 
of thought which I am advocating. There is a Passive Fallacy 
in practical conduct as in speculation, and anything that 
encourages us to discard the one suggests the discarding of the 
other. Now I hope I shall not lay myself open to the charge 
of optimistic exaggeration if I express the belief that the life 
of action is worth more and has a better chance of success 
just now than at most epochs in the past. The best form of 
striving is the realising of a fine ideal, and the chances of 
ideals are better than they used to be. Formerly they were 
Utopias, beacons lighted in a dark land, Republics that stimu-
lated enthusiasm and imagination but never had the smallest 
chance of getting realised. Such ideals have a valuable, indeed 
a priceless, function; but even more encouraging to exertion 
are ideals which can be realised, of which, in the spheres of 
religion, politics and social improvement, there are no despicable 
number at the present time. And hence it results that practice, 
so to speak, is getting more and more mixed with ideality. A 
philosophy of striving is likely to be increasingly acceptable 
to a society in which striving for good objects is common and 
has no small chance of success. 
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